Sorokin Revisited: The Fate of Grand Theory or the Possibility of Cultural Sociology

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Introduction

Who reads Sorokin now? Is Sorokin dead? This is the problem discussed in this paper. Is Sorokin a lost sociologist or an active sociologist?

I think that under some actual contemporary conditions, Sorokin's sociological thought has become significant. This paper, in particular, focuses on Sorokin's contributions in the sphere of "Cultural Sociology." Thus, I would like to elucidate the possibility of cultural sociology in Sorokin's works.¹

After the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the structure of polar opposition between the USA and USSR was dissolved. Once emancipated from many political and ideological restrictions, multiple nations, cultures and religions started to strongly assert themselves. As a result, they have opposed one another. As to culture and religion, its particularity and uniqueness on the one hand, and its intolerance and exclusiveness on the other hand, have been revealed. In a word, "Culture" has foregrounded. These are the academic and scholarly situations which are called "cultural turn."

When we attempt to understand and explain societies and groups, markets and power, human beings and bodies, gender and discrimination, organization and disorganization, disaster and risk, conflict and solidarity, sympathy and mistrust etc., we have to appeal to a property, structure, and performance of "the cultural." We can not only resort to the economic, political, social or psychological explanations; we also need the cultural one. Although "Culture" has arrived late, it has steadily become a powerful "explanatory factor" on the
historical scene of sociology.

Here we will define "culture" provisionally in the following way. "Culture is a symbolic pattern which is shared by social members and controls their actions through being institutionalized in social systems and internalized in personalities." This definition, as suggested by "social system," "institutionalization," "internalization," is constituted of Parsons' action theoretic and functionalist concept of culture, and as manifested in the word of "symbol," it is also of Lévi-Strauss' semiologic and structuralist concept.

Thus, we may like to emphasize the explanatory power of culture as an independent variable or explanans when we explain sociocultural phenomena. Such a sociology which presupposes a "cultural autonomy" from socioeconomic and material structures may be called a "cultural sociology." "Cultural sociology" is distinct from the "sociology of cultures" which regards culture as explanandum, that is, as dependent upon society, economy, polity and psychology etc. (Alexander, 2003: 12-14). In the following sections, while discussing the views of Émile Durkheim (1858-1917), Talcott Parsons(1902-1979), and in particular, Pitirim A. Sorokin (1889-1968) who had advocated this type of cultural sociological thoughts, we will look for the possibility of "cultural sociology."

Durkheim: Forerunner of Cultural Sociology

In Durkheim's sociology, it is important to inquire into his concepts of "collective consciousness or collective conscience (conscience collective)" or "collective representation (représentation collective)." Collective conscience is defined as "the totality of beliefs and sentiments common to the average members of the same society [which] forms a determinate system with its own life" (Durkheim, [1893]1960: 46; trans. by Simpson: 79, Halls: 38-39). As Parsons pointed out, "collective conscience" had, in its original use [in De la division du travail social, 1893], the ethical or value character (Parsons, [1937]1949: 318). In comparison to this, "collective representation" expresses "the way in which the group con-
ceives itself in its relation to objects which affect it” (Durkheim, 1895: xvii; trans.: xlix). Therefore, it has a cognitive or psychological connotation. Whether it is normative or cognitive, collective conscience or collective representation, in a word, may be called a “culture or perceived culture” (Bohannan, 1960: 78-79, 81-82).

Now, Durkheim writes about collective representation in relation to its material basis as follows:

While it is through the collective substratum (substrat collectif) that collective life (vie collective) is connected to the rest of the world, it is not absorbed in it. It is at the same time dependent on and distinct from it, as is the function of organ. As it is born of the collective substratum the forms which it manifests at the time of its origin, and which are consequently fundamental, naturally bear the marks of their origin. For this reason the basic matter of the social consciousness is in close relation with the number of social elements and the way they are grouped and distributed, etc.—that is to say, with the nature of the substratum. But once a basic number of representations has been thus created, they become...partially autonomous realities (réalités partiellement autonomes) with their own way of life. They have the power to attract and repel each other and to form amongst themselves various syntheses, which are determined by their natural affinities and not by the condition of their matrix. As a consequence, the new representations born of these syntheses have the same nature; they are immediately caused by other collective representations and not by this or that characteristic of the social structure (Durkheim, 1898: 33-34; trans.: 30-31).

This passage reveals that collective representations, namely cultures, can be autonomous or independent from a social structure or material basis, and they may be able to develop immanently. Such a conception of “cultural autonomy” will culminate in the following passages in *Les Formes élémentaires*
Collective representations very frequently attribute to the things to which they refer qualities which do not exist under any form or to any degree. Out of the commonest object, they can make a most powerful sacred being... Social thought (pensée sociale), owing to the imperative authority that is in it, has an efficacy that individual thought could never have; by the power which it has over our minds, it can make us see things in whatever light it pleases; it adds to reality or deducts from it according to the circumstances. Thus there is one division of nature where the formula of idealism is applicable almost to the letter: this is the social kingdom. Here more than anywhere else, the idea creates the reality (l'idée fait la réalité) (Durkheim, [1912]1960: 326; trans. Swain: 259-260; Karen: 229, emphasis added).

[Of course] in order to express our own ideas even to ourselves, it is necessary that we fix them upon material things which symbolize them. But here the part of matter is reduced to a minimum. The object serving as support for the idea is not much in comparison with the ideal superstructure (superstructure idéale), beneath which it disappears, and, also it counts for nothing in the superstructure (Durkheim, [1912]1960: 326-327; trans. Swain: 260; Karen: 229-230).

It follows from the above statements that collective representation or social thought (cultural or symbolic thinking) has an power which transforms real things into ideal beings, and, ideal superstructure (=culture) cannot reduce to material objects. Here we can see a clear idea of cultural autonomy in Durkheim’s thought.

In relation to this point, J.C. Alexander pointed out some time ago. "Only in the studies which began in the later 1890s did Durkheim have an explicit the-
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ory of symbolic process firmly in hand. It was at this time that he became deeply interested in religion ... Durkheim came to believe that theories of secular social process have to be modelled upon the workings of the sacred world. This turn to religion, he emphasized, was not because of an interest in church things. It was because he wanted to give cultural processes more theoretical autonomy. In religion he had discovered a model of how symbolic processes work in their own terms" (Alexander, 1988:2, emphasis added).

Moreover, recently Alexander and Ph. Smith have said as follows: “The tide[of the reading of Durkheim’s development as shifting to the religious-cum-cultural] began to turn in the 1980s, slowly at first but with gathering speed into 1990s. Concepts like ritual, symbolism, representation, morality, and solidarity began to appear alongside discussions of discourse, difference, structure, and meaning, and the Durkheimian roots of a newly cultural sociology became not only increasingly evident but increasingly acknowledged, as one scholar after another read with pleasure and astonishment the Elementary Forms, as if for the first time” (Smith and Alexander, 2005:13, emphasis added).

Thus we can find “cultural autonomy” and “cultural sociology” in the late Durkheim. As it were, Durkheim was a forerunner of cultural sociology.

Parsons: Theoretical Elaboration

The concept of culture in Parsons is constructed from the perspective of action theory. He analytically decomposes concrete action phenomena into three systems: personalities as organizations of actions of a single actor, social systems as organizations of interactions, and cultural systems as organizations of values, norms and symbols in his works in the 1950s (The Social System, 1951; Toward a General Theory of Action, ed. with E.A. Shils, 1951). In this case, Parsons thought the three systems are “autonomous” from each other at the analytical level, but they are “interpenetrated” at the concrete level. Therefore in this stage, the three systems were conceived as equivalent, and, even a
cultural system was looked at from "functional significance" for personality system or social system as action system. It seems that the cultural system had not any "privileged status" in relation to personality or social system, and, it ultimately had been reduced to "functioning of action." In a word, "cultural autonomy" was relatively low.

However, as a four-function paradigm and a cybernetic hierarchy of control scheme developed since the 1960s, the cultural system(specialized around L function of action system) at the highest level of cybernetic order in action system, has come to be conceived as controlling or governing the following three systems at lower levels—social system (I function), the personality system (G function) and the behavioral system (A function) . Parsons said, "In the sense, and only that sense, of emphasizing the importance of the cybernetically highest elements in patterning action systems, I am a cultural determinist, rather than a social determinist" (Parsons, 1966: 113). Thus in the late phase of Parsons, "cultural autonomy" came to be relatively high.

As Fox, Lidz and Bershady summarized H. Staubmann's discussions about Parsons, in Parsons' view culture is a system in its own right, with its own integrity and autonomy, but it is also a subsystem of the larger action system. In its autonomous functions culture influences, but does not determine, processes in the social system, the personality system, and the behavioral system. Culture as a subsystem is also influenced but not determined by each of the other subsystems (Fox, Lidz and Bershady, 2005: 21).

In his later years, Parsons emphasized the power of control over the social system, personality and behavioral organism as lower level subsystems of action system by cultural system as the highest level subsystem situated in the highest dimension L(Latent-pattern maintenance) of action system. Also, he affirmed the centrality of normative culture(evaluative symbol)—value and norm—among cultures or cultural subsystems, and, its predominance over cognitive culture and expressive culture. Moreover, "constitutive symbolism" on which the other three cultures—normative culture, cognitive culture and ex-
pressive culture—are grounded, is brought to the fore. A constitutive symbolism or an existential belief is a subsystem situated in the highest dimension L of cultural system, and it is a cultural type or religious symbolism which orients to the problem of “ultimate concern” (Paul Tillich) and concerns the grounds of actor’s meaning-orientations themselves (Parsons, 1966: 28; with Platt, 1973: 313).

Parsons, in the magnum opus he wrote in his later years, *Action Theory and the Human Condition*, 1978, presented a “Paradigm of the Human Condition” as the most general system (Parsons, 1978: chap.15). This human condition system situates an action system itself which involves a cultural system, as its subsystem. Also, in the highest dimension L of this human condition system, “telic system” is located. This telic system is the “transempirical” symbol-meaning system, which can ultimately control the cultural system as L subsystem of action system, in particular, the constitutive symbolism as L subsystem of cultural system. Moreover, the telic system which concerns Max Weber’s “problems of meaning,” differentiates into meanings of “ultimate agency,” “ultimate fulfillment,” “ultimate order,” and “ultimate ground.” The last “ultimate ground” is the meaning system of a conception of what is ultimately ultimate and it articulates with cultural system (subsystem) as constitutive symbolism.

The above cultural system as system of value, norm and meaning, while being grounded on the telic system, is institutionalized and embodied gradually downwards from higher-order system to lower-order system on the basis of hierarchical levels of “generality” (*e.g.* ultimate ground → constitutive symbolism → institutionalized societal value → functionally differentiated norms → goal orientations of actors). Conversely, a cultural system is generalized and abstracted gradually upwards according to hierarchical levels of “grounding.”

Thus “the cultural” in a broad sense, that is, “telic system” or “cultural system” is institutionalized in concrete social systems, internalized in individual personalities and embodied in individual behavioral organisms while descending downwards hierarchy of system levels through cybernetic controls. The
cultural can provide a latent pattern peculiar to each of these systems. In the last analysis, in Parsons’ explanatory scheme, it is thought that the most general and abstract “cultural factor” functions as giving “order” for particular-contextual and concrete-empirical sociocultural phenomena, groups and individual actions. It follows from the above discussions that Parsons’ concept of culture demonstrates “cultural autonomy” provided with explanatory power, at the principle level rather than at the empirical level. It is the theoretical elaboration of cultural sociology that Parsons performed.

Sorokin: Essence of Cultural Sociology

What is fundamental to Sorokin’s cultural sociology is the concept of “Culture Mentality.” This is the internal aspect, which belongs to the realm of “mind, value and meaning.” The internal aspect is expressed or externalized by the external aspect of culture (realm of objects, events, processes), but at the same time, the former aspect controls the latter aspect. In a word, as to an integrated system of culture the internal aspect, namely culture mentality is paramount (Sorokin, [1937-1941]1962: vol. I: 55-56). This concept is discussed in his magnum opus, Social and Cultural Dynamics, 4 vols. 1937-1941.

Three Types of Culture Mentality
Culture mentalities or cultures are classified into three types according to “major premises” (Sorokin, [1937-1941]1962: vol. I: 66-101). To begin with, two profoundly different types can be differentiated; the Ideational type of culture mentality and Sensate type. A balanced synthesis of these both types will be called Idealistic.

These three types of culture mentality are founded on their own peculiar major premises, which concern the following four items: (1) the nature of reality, (2) the nature of the needs and ends to be satisfied, (3) the extent to which these needs and ends are to be satisfied, (4) the methods of satisfaction. Ac-
According to the major premises in terms of these items, the following types of culture mentality or (internal) cultural system can be mentioned.

**A: Ideational Culture Mentality**
In this culture mentality or cultural system, (1) reality is perceived as nonsensate, and nonmaterial, everlasting Being (*Sein*); (2) the needs and ends are mainly spiritual; (3) the extent of their satisfaction is the largest, and the level, highest; (4) the method of their fulfillment or realization is self-imposed minimization or elimination of most of the physical needs. On the basis of variations under (4), two subclasses of the Ideational Mentality can be distinguished.

**A-1: Ascetic Ideationalism**
This seeks the consummation of the needs and ends through an excessive elimination and minimization of the carnal needs, supplemented by a complete detachment from the sensate world and even from oneself, viewing both as mere illusion, nonexisting, such as the Hindu and Buddhist etc.

**A-2: Active Ideationalism**
This seeks the realization of the needs and ends, not only through minimization of the carnal needs, but also through the transformation of the sensate world, and especially of the sociocultural world, in such a way as to reform it along the lines of the spiritual reality and of the ends chosen as main value. The great spiritual reformers, like the early Christian Apostles etc., are examples of this mentality.

**B: Sensate Culture Mentality**
This mentality (1) views reality as only that which is presented to the sense organs, it does not seek or believe in any supersensory reality; (2) its needs and aims are physical; (3) maximum satisfaction is sought; (4) the method of realizing needs is not that of a modification within the human individuals, but of a modification or exploitation of the external world. On the basis of item (4), it is
possible to distinguish three varieties as follows.

**B-1: Active Sensate Culture Mentality (Active “Epicureans”)**
It seeks the consummation of its needs and ends through the most “efficient” modification, adjustment, readjustment, reconstruction of the external milieu. This method is the transformation of the inorganic, organic and the sociocultural world. The great conquerors and builders of empire are examples of this.

**B-2: Passive Sensate Culture Mentality (Passive “Epicureans”)**
This is characterized by the attempt to fulfill physical needs and aims, neither through the inner modification of self, nor through efficient reconstruction of the external world, but through a parasitic exploitation and utilization of the external reality as it is, viewed as the mere means for enjoying sensual pleasures. “Carpe diem” (Seize the day) is the motto of this mentality.

**B-3: Cynical Sensate Culture Mentality (Cynical “Epicureans”)**
This type, in seeking to achieve the satisfaction of its needs, uses a specific technique of donning and doffing Ideational masks which promise the greatest returns in physical profit. This is exemplified by all the Tartuffes of the world, those who are accustomed to change their psychosocial “colors” and to re-adjust their values in order to run along with the stream.

**C: Idealistic Culture Mentality**
This type is the only form where the Ideational and Sensate forms are mixed, which is logically integrated. It synthesizes the premises of both types into one inwardly consistent and harmonious unity. For it reality is multi-sided, with the aspects of everlasting Being and ever-changing Becoming of the spiritual and material. Its needs and ends are both spiritual and material, with the material, however, subordinated to the spiritual. The methods of their realization involve both the modification of self and the transformation of the external sen-
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sate world. In other words, this mentality gives suum cuique (to each his own) to the Ideational and the Sensate. Confucianism is an example of this.

Relations of Three Types of Culture Mentality
What are the relations among the three types of culture mentality described above? We can find the following three relations: that is, a relation of historical periods, a structural relation and a cyclical-dynamic relation in Sorokin’s descriptions.

Historical periods
Periods when three types were developing are as follows.
First cycle: Ideational Culture Mentality or Ideational Culture was dominant in early Greece (Homeric Greece) until the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. Then, Idealistic Culture flourished in the fourth century (Socrates, Plato and Aristotle). Finally, Sensate Culture (Hellenistic Greece) lasted from the third century B.C. to the fourth century A.D.

Second cycle: Ideational Culture rose to become predominant in the fifth century and was supreme until the fourteenth century (Christianity). Then, Idealistic Culture prevailed from the thirteenth century to the fifteenth century (e.g. Thomas Aquinas). Sensate Culture has been dominant from the sixteenth century to the present (e.g. Francis Bacon, Descartes).

Thus, as Sorokin said, in the Graeco-Roman and Western Cultures, three-phase rhythm of Ideational-Idealistic-Sensate has happened at least twice during the twenty-five centuries (Sorokin, [1937-1941]1962: vol. IV: 424; Jeffries, 2002: 109-110).

Structural Relation
As to the structural relation among the three types, I would like to make two observations. First, none of these three cultural mentalities or cultural systems exists monopolistically without the “coexistence” of the other two systems. Though contemporary culture is predominantly Sensate, it coexists with the
Ideational as well as Idealistic cultures. The complete integration of culture the-
thesis as supported by Malinowski *etc.* is false (Sorokin, [1937-1941]1962: vol. IV: 141).

Second, these three cultural systems are much more vast and encompassing
than the other cultural systems. Therefore, these cultural systems are called the
“supersystems”, and the other cultural systems are called “systems” or “subsys-
tems.” These systems are the big five cultural systems [Language, Science, Re-
ligion, Fine Arts and Ethics (composed by two subsystems: Law and Morals)]
and their derivative cultural subsystems (Philosophical, Economic and Political
Systems etc.). It should be noted that the three supersystems, five big systems
and a large number of derivative subsystems make up the “multilayered” struc-
ture of culture (Yoshino, 2009: 192-194). In this case, each of the supersystems
(Ideational, Idealistic and Sensate cultures) “cuts cross” all of the big five sys-
tems and their many derivative subsystems, and unites all the big five systems
and an enormous number of derivative subsystems into one supersystem—Ide-

**Cyclical-dynamic relation**
What is the dynamic relation among three supersystems? Sorokin presented
the “super-rhythm” of the Ideational-Idealistic-Sensate phases in the Graeco-
Roman and Western supersystems of culture. By virtue of the principle of
“immanent change,” each of three supersystems of culture or three culture
mentalities cannot help changing according to their inherent potentialities.

By the principle of the “limited possibility,” this immanent change of culture
mentalities cannot occur outside this recurring super-rhythm. In a word, the
Ideational culture system moves toward Sensate culture with the opposite
premise, but it reaches the border or “limits” of its potential expansion. Dialec-
tically, the move toward the Sensate extreme produces Ideational counter-
trends which cause discord and disorganization and move the system toward
a more moderate Idealistic culture. However due to the difficulty of maintain-
ing a balance between conflicting opposites of the Ideational versus Sensate,

From the above discussions it may be said that a culture mentality or cultural system, whether it is structurally “super-transcendent” or dynamically “immanent,” presupposes the “autonomy” of the cultural system. Sorokin said, “Any inwardly integrated system is autonomous self-regulating, self-directing ... unity. Its life course is set down in its essentials when the system is born. This is one of the specific aspects of the larger principle which may be called ‘immanent self-regulation and self-direction’” (Sorokin, [1937-1941]1962, vol. I: 51). Here we can find the essence of Sorokin’s Cultural Sociology.

Concluding Remarks

Durkheim, pointing out a relative autonomy of collective conscience or collective representation from social or material structures, suggested the possibility of cultural sociology, but he did not intend to develop it. To be sure, Parsons theoretically elaborated cultural sociology by making use of action theoretical concepts such as the four-function paradigm (AGIL schema) and the hierarchy of cybernetic control scheme. However, also he attempted to develop the action theory only, but he did not aim at completing the cultural sociology itself.

Only Sorokin attempted to straightforwardly discuss and construct cultural sociology with the presupposition of “cultural autonomy.” In particular, he stressed “immanent change” or “autonomous self-regulation” of culture mentality or cultural system. Of course, Parsons also perceived the “immanent development,” but he merely treated it on the micro level and in the restricted sphere, that is, on the level and in the restricted sphere of science’s immanent development through reciprocal interaction between theoretical structure and observed facts (Ohno, 2012: 135-138).

Moreover, it should be noted that Sorokin not only discussed his cultural
sociology from a value-neutral and purely scientific perspective, but also he regarded it as criticizing the corruption of contemporary sensate culture from the normative point of view, in particular, in terms of “integralism” and “altruism.” Sorokin predicted in the final chapter of his *magnum opus* as follows:

The present status of Western culture and society gives a tragic spectrum of the beginning of the disintegration of their Sensate supersystem. Therefore, their nearest future, measured by years and even a few decades, will pass under the sign of the *dies irae, dies illa* [day of wrath, day that] of transition to a new Ideational or Idealistic phase (Sorokin, [1937-1941]1962: vol. IV: 775).

It is in the above messages that we can get a glimpse of one of the actual significations of Sorokins’ cultural sociology under the world contemporary situations characterized by Economic Crisis, Technological Risks and Natural Disasters.

Notes
1) This article is based, with minor changes, on the paper given at the Interim Conference, Research Committee on the History of Sociology, International Sociological Association (ISA), University College Dublín(UCD), 27-30 June 2012. I should like to thank Professor Kiyomitsu Yui, Kobe University for my attendance and presentation at this Conference.
2) Moreover they continue that on the contrary, in their *heteronomous functions*, cultural elements such as artworks, literature, and knowledge of musical compositions or performers are put to the use of political or economic ends, and in this respect such elements are not evaluated by cultural standards but by other considerations such as their monetary value, or as indicators of taste, status, or class position (Fox, Lidz and Bershady, 2005: 21-22).

And, Staubmann says in the concrete context as follows: As to the autonomous function of culture, “Personal and social life unfolds and realizes itself within objectified cultural forms. This is the fundamental significance of culture within (sub)systems of action ... Neither of these processes[of internalization and institutionalization]
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is to be understood as a simple input mechanism in the sense of cultural determinism blurring the clear distinctions between subsystems...On the contrary, it is a matter of the formation of genuinely personal and social structures and processes. In both cases, however, this is accomplished by giving primacy to culture in the criterion of their forming.” As to the heteronomous function of culture, he criticizes Bourdieu’s theoretical frame as the “conception of the over-economized man” which insists that “resulting aesthetic judgments are a matter of class distinction” (Staubmann, 2005: 173-174; 175). In a word Bourdieu has excluded the autonomous function of culture. While Parsons could transcend opposition between idealist (cultural) and materialist(economic, political) stances by regarding a culture as one of subsystems of action and recognizing a cultural autonomy.

3) Some conflicts or strains between Sorokin and Parsons are well known. The beginnings of difficulties between them was Sorokin’s harsh criticism of draft of Parsons’ magnum opus, *The Structure of Social Action* (Johnston, 1995: 97-99). Afterward this criticism was expressed officially and explicitly in his *Sociological Theories of Today* (Sorokin, 1966: 403-411). Moreover symbolically and concretely Sorokin’s criticism of Parson’s *Structure* seems to be manifested in the following Sorokin’s action. Sorokin writes in the margin of *The Structure of Social Action*, the first edition published in 1937 by New York and London: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., dedicated to Sorokin by Parsons, not a few negative words such as “wrong,” “Not at all,” “vague” etc., and many question marks. In particular, as to Parsons’ interpretation of Durkheim, Sorokin writes in the top margin of p.713 as follows: “This is all Parsonianism but not Durkheimism.” (Cf., An inscribed copy of the first edition of *The Structure of Social Action* in the Pitirim A. Sorokin Collection at the University of Saskatchewan Library, Saskatoon, Canada which I visited in 2011). To be sure, the oppositions between Sorokin and Parsons, such as integralism(founded on not one-sided truth but integral truth) versus analytical realism, modified holism versus pseudo-nominalism, theoretical divergence and pluralism versus theoretical convergence, seem to be superficially salient(Sorokin, [1937-19411962: vol. IV: 762-763; Parsons, [1937]1949: 730,747-748; Zafirovski, 2001: 239). However, if we can do an in-depth reading into texts of both sociologists, we may see their views converge on the point of cultural system concept. Their concepts of culture or cultural system have common connotations in the following three points: “immanency,” “value and meaning,” “symbol system” (Ohno, 2012:134-140).
4) The so-called Sorokin’s “prophetic sociology” made him lonely in the world of sociologists as well as Harvard. It is certain that distinguishing between sociological and scientific statements and prophetic words is important. But I think that we must take stance of not Weber who recognized the gulf between ‘Is’ and ‘Ought’, empirical propositions and value judgements, but Durkheim who attempted to bridge this gulf in the most emergent situations with which contemporary world is faced globally (Coser, 1977: 476-477, 505-508; Johnston, 1995: 124-128, 174-180; Jensen, 2012: 38-47; Ponomareva, 2011).

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