

Two Types of Utterance and Deviation from the Norm

— Another Facet of the Speaker
in a Speaker-Interlocutor Relationship —

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1. Introduction

All linguistic expressions are subjective in that they are uttered by the speaker, and it is difficult to make a wholly objective utterance. One form of an objective utterance is to report what the speaker has heard from someone. For instance, if the speaker has heard Mr. Forster say, "I neglect my children," the speaker is likely to report the situation using a reporting verb: *Mr. Forster says that he neglects his children* (Quirk et al. 1985: 613). The role of the speaker is just to report what he or she has heard from someone. What the speaker wants to convey in this type of sentence is the content of the message; here, on the content level, the speaker's judgment or interpretation is not involved. On the other hand, the same sentence *Mr. Forster neglects his children* is likely to convey the speaker's judgment based on the information gathered by the speaker. The utterance is now subjective, as what the speaker conveys is not the objective content of the message, but the speaker's judgment.

In papers I published previously (Kitabayashi 2002 and 2006), I examined some of the syntactic and semantic traits of utterance on the content and judgment levels. One of the characteristics of judgment sentences is that a judgment is made on the basis of some facts. In the following sentence, the speaker's judgment that "you should study all

night" is made on the basis of the fact that "you have exams tomorrow".

(1) You should study all night, if you have exams tomorrow.

However, there is an exceptional case. Sentence (2) is deviant from the norm in that the judgment that there is a whiskey bottle behind the books is based on the information which cannot be verified in an objective way, since the only way to verify the speaker's memory is to check whether the whiskey bottle is behind the books nor not (cf. Pelyvás 1996: 76-77).

(2) If I remember correctly, there is a whiskey bottle behind the books.

Note that the above sentence assumes some kind of stylistic effect. The *if*-clause modifies the probability of the speaker's proposition, and this makes the interpersonal communication smooth in case there is not a whiskey bottle behind the books after all.

In this paper I will examine these two types of utterance on the content and judgment level, and the deviant forms from the norm. I also proceed to investigate what stylistic effects are produced by the deviation from the norm, and I also intend to claim that such stylistic phenomena should be analyzed on the level of real communication in which both the speaker and interlocutor are involved.

2. Two types of utterance

In the Introduction, we examined two types of utterance. The distinction is related to the authority of the utterance (Quirk et al. 1985: 615). If the speaker obtains certain information from someone and re-

ports it to the interlocutor, the speaker may want to make it explicit who has the authority of the information. The speaker presents the information that has been obtained in an objective way, without giving his or her judgment. Put another way, employing a reporting expression such as *Mr. Forster says that he neglects his children*, the speaker does not “accept responsibility for the propositional content of the utterance” (Maat and Sanders 2000: 65).

Now let us examine the interpretation of *Mr. Forster neglects his children* as a judgment sentence. Suppose the speaker has gathered pieces of information about Mr. Forster’s activities and reputation, and made a judgment about Mr. Forster. In this case, *Mr. Forster neglects his children* can be regarded as a judgment sentence. The speaker functions not only as the speaker of the utterance, but as the person who makes a judgment about the content of the utterance. If we represent this situation schematically, it will be something like this:




Diagram 1

The above schema of cause and effect can be amplified as: “From things I have heard and seen, I claim it to be a fair and true assessment that Mr Forster neglects his children” (Quirk et al. 1985: 614). To show that the propositional content is the speaker’s judgment, the speaker is likely to use auxiliaries such as *may* and *might* or adverbs such as *probably*, but a simple form such as *Mr. Forster neglects his children* can also be used as a judgment sentence. The point here is that in a judgment sentence the speaker is involved in the interpretation of the sentence.

As the diagram shows, the observation acts on the speaker, who consequently concludes some proposition as a judgment. In this sense, the speaker as the person who makes a judgment accepts responsibility for the content of the utterance. The authority of the utterance is in the speaker.

What will happen then if the speaker obtains a sufficient amount of information as a basis of judgment? The speaker will be convinced of the propositional content and may use auxiliaries such as *must*. If the speaker assumes that the propositional content is objective, he or she may use a simple expression such as *Mr. Forster neglects his children*. Thus, it can be interpreted on the content level if the speaker has sufficient evidence of Mr. Forster's negligence of his children. In English, the expression on the content level can be identical with the one on the judgment level. The sentence *Mr. Forster neglects his children* as an objective sentence asserts the fact that Mr. Forster neglects his children without reserve. Thus it shows the public viewpoint of the situation, not the speaker's personal viewpoint. The fact that Mr. Forster neglects his children is considered common knowledge; therefore, the presence of the speaker is not implied, which means the speaker does not have to assume the responsibility for the statement. After all, the knowledge common to anyone in the same way is understood as objective, thus reducing the amount of responsibility that the speaker must assume.

What is now clear is that there are two types of utterance in language. One is the objective utterance on the content level and the other is the speaker's judgmental utterance on the judgment level. The judgment can be understood in a cause-effect schema in which some observation affects the speaker in the cause component, and then the speaker makes a judgment in the effect component. In addition, sufficient pieces of information in the cause component raise the level of evidentiality,

which turns a judgment sentence into an objective expression.

3. Two types of utterance and sentences with conjunctions

In the previous section, we examined two types of utterance. The same way of analysis can hold for the analysis of conjunctions. Sweetser (1990: 76-87) proves that the use of conjunctions in English can be understood in the same way two types of utterance are analyzed within the discourse.

3.1. The content level

On the content level, the two events, cause and effect, should be interpreted in the world of real happenings. The role of the speaker is to report the situation objectively. The following sentence illustrates this situation.

(3) Anna dropped her book because Victor bumped into her.

The conjunction *because* in sentence (3) connects the two events that happened in the real world. Victor's bumping into Anne (the cause component) acts on her, and consequently she dropped her book (the effect component). In this example, the speaker is not involved in the interpretation of the utterance, as the speaker's role is just to utter the sentence.

In (3), the reason why Anna dropped her book is asserted. The speaker wants to convey the reason why Anna dropped her book. Sentence (3) normally presupposes that Anna dropped her book and asserts that this is caused by Victor's bumping into her (cf. Sweetser 1990: 82-83).

Another possibility of the *because*-clause on the content level is the

use of a comma before the subordinate clause, which is illustrated below. In this case, we are forced to read the sentence in a different way.

(4) Anna dropped her book, because Victor bumped into her.

In the normal reading, both of the events, 1) Anna dropped her book, and 2) the reason why she dropped her book was Victor's bumping into her, are asserted. In Givón's terms, both of the contents in the main and subordinate clauses can be challenged by the interlocutor (cf. Verstraete 2007: 150-151). In a commaless combined sentence like (3), what is at issue is whether Victor bumped into Anna or not, not whether Anna dropped her book or not. Only the content of the subordinate clause can be challenged by the interlocutor. On the other hand, in the combined sentence with a comma, the contents both in the main and subordinate clauses are open to be challenged by the interlocutor.

Let me proceed to discuss the combination of the two clauses with another example. Chronological order is sometimes represented by using the conjunction *when*. On the content level, the speaker gives a chronological order of the two events with the conjunction *when*.

(5) I was doing the dishes when he came in.

The most common reading is that the speaker was washing the dishes and during that event he came in. The foreground information is expressed in the main clause and the subordinate clause is backgrounded relative to the main clause, providing a temporal reference point for the event described in the main clause. In the underlined sentence, the main clause should be understood as the foreground information.

(6) The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is an international treaty

designed to promote nuclear disarmament. Under the Treaty, five countries are regarded as nuclear-weapon states. Those countries are the U. S., Britain, Russia, China and France. All of them had nuclear weapons when the Treaty became effective in 1970. The treaty prohibits these countries' proliferation of nuclear weapons. It also prohibits other member states from producing or possessing them. (http://www.eow.alc.co.jp)

Thus, the sentences following the underlined temporal sentence are related to the content of the main clause of the underlined part.

What is common in the clause combinations with the content-conjunctions is that the information presented by the subordinate clause should add something new to the discourse. In the case of the *because*-clause the reason is added to the main clause and in the case of the *when*-clause the time reference is added to the discourse.

3.2. The judgment level

This section considers clause combinations in which the speaker's judgment is involved. When two clauses are juxtaposed as in (7), one reading is that the cause-effect relationship is latent even if there is no specific signal to show a causal relationship. Therefore, the following sentence can be read as meaning the speaker's judgment ("he must have turned over a new leaf") on the basis of the fact presented in the first sentence ("My son doesn't talk back these days").

- (7) My son doesn't talk back these days; he must have turned over a new leaf.

Note that the basis of the judgment is a statement considered to be a fact rather than a statement as a judgment. This is a natural consequ-

ence, considering that a judgment should be made on the basis of facts.

The schema of cause-effect holds true when the conjunction *because* is employed specifically to show a causal relationship between the two clauses. The following example does not mean that the light causes Dawson to stay at home. Rather, it is normally understood as meaning that the speaker's knowledge of the light's being on, as a premise, causes the conclusion of Dawson's being at home.

(8) Dawson must be at home, because the light is on.

The analysis of the judgment sentence discussed in Section 2 can hold true for the clause combination on the judgment level. The only difference is whether the basis of the judgment is verbalized explicitly or not. Whereas the judgment reading of the sentence *Mr. Forster neglects his children* does not provide specific observations of the speaker as the basis of the judgment, the clause-combination with *because* on the judgment level offers the basis of the judgment explicitly, i. e. *the light is on*. Diagram 2 represents this situation.




Diagram 2

As another example of the judgment combination of two clauses, we can give the clause combination with the conjunction *if*. Look at the following sentence (Pelyvás 1996: 60).

(9) You should study all night, if you have exams tomorrow.

The speaker of this utterance assumes that the condition will be fulfilled. Thus the fact that there are exams tomorrow is a premise in this example. The *if*-clause, therefore, does not express a real condition, but rather the reason why the speaker has reached a certain conclusion, i. e. "you should study all night".

What is common to clause-combinations with conjunctions *because* and *if* is that the judgment of the speaker is made on the basis of the information as a fact which can be verified in an objective way. It is natural that judgments are based on facts, not on the speaker's opinions or feelings.

4. Deviation from the norm on the content level

In this and the next sections, I will consider utterances of the clause combination deviant from the norm on the content and judgment levels. In this section we will re-examine some of the grammatical traits of the utterance on the content level and argue how the deviant forms on the content level play a special communicative function in the discourse.

4.1. Deviation of chronological order on the content level

Section 3.1 dealt with the chronologically-combined sentences with the conjunction *when*. In sentence (10), the chronological order is represented and the subordinate clause serves as a temporal reference point for the action described in the main clause.

(10) I was doing the dishes when he came in.

The above sentence has a second reading which can be paraphrased something like: "I was doing the dishes, and rather in an unexpected way he came in". This construction is called "narrative-*when*-clause"

by Akatsuka and Tsubomoto (1998). Let me give some more examples.

- (11) a. He was about to shut the door, when John put his foot on the threshold.
b. I was watching the television, when suddenly the lights went out. (Akatsuka and Tsubomoto 1998: 135)

The narrative-*when*-clause differs from an ordinary temporally-combined clause in that the main clause serves as the setting of the event and the event presented in the subordinate clause appears as the foreground. Thus, the *when*-clauses in (11) do not provide the temporal background for the main clause. On the contrary, it is the main clause event that functions as the background against which the event represented in the subordinate clause will build up.

Let me consider further the nature of the foreground information represented in the subordinate clause. As we examined in Section 3, in an ordinary temporal *when*-clause, the information in the main clause will be developed in the subsequent parts of the discourse. However, in the narrative-*when*-clause, this is not the case. Note how the event in the narrative-*when*-clause is developed in the following discourse.

- (12) Juanita was reading a story to Estela, when a knock sounded on the apartment door. Visitors at any time were rare, almost unheard of this late. (Akatsuka and Tsubomoto 1998: 139)

The narrative-*when*-clause is used in a context in which events related with the one presented in the *when*-clause are verbalized in the subsequent discourse. In the above discourse, *a knock on the door* in the *when*-clause will develop into the information about the visitor who knocked the door in the subsequent discourse.

In a normal reading of the *when*-clause, the grammatical subject can control the action presented in the main clause. Thus, in *I was doing the dishes when he came in*, the subject ("I") can control the action of doing the dishes. The speaker can stop doing the dishes because the action is under the control of the speaker. However, the reading of the narrative-*when*-clause represents the speaker's inability to control the action presented in the main clause. In other words, his entrance was so unexpected to the speaker that it was impossible for the speaker to stop doing the dishes. Rather, his entrance stopped the speaker from doing the dishes because the speaker was so surprised. By presenting the events in deviancy, i. e. the background information in the main clause and the foreground information in the subordinate clause, the speaker intends to communicate a temporal order of the events to the interlocutor with a special stylistic effect: in this case, the speaker's unexpectedness.

In the normal use of the *when*-clause, the subordinate clause restricts the action presented in the main clause. The subordinate *when*-clause provides a reference point of the action described in the main clause. However, it is the event in the narrative-*when*-clause that is the foreground, building up towards the action that really matters in the discourse, and the main clause serves as the background. It is the speaker's discretion to employ this special grammatical construction. The speaker presents the mainstream events in the position normally reserved for the background.

If the subordinate clause originally reserved for the background is used to describe the event which will be pushed forward in the subsequent discourse, the interlocutor is forced to re-interpret the background information as the foreground. This is exactly what the speaker intends. The information normally interpreted as the foreground information is now forced to be interpreted as the background

because the event described in the subordinate clause is subsequently moved forward in the subsequent discourse. The narrative-*when*-clause is a deviation from the norm in the sense that the normal foreground-background relation is reversed; and the deviation is manipulated by the speaker to tell the interlocutor that he or she wants to show the information in an exceptional way and invites the interlocutor to share surprise and unexpectedness.

4.2. Deviation of the *because*-clause on the content level

The following sentence was uttered by the former president of Sierra Leone, who appeared on the TV documentary program, *The Story of English*. He sometimes dropped in at a market to buy some fish while he was president, and the fish merchant charged him high prices. The president accepted the situation and did not take it seriously, considering his social status as president.

(13) Sometimes they charged high prices, because I was a president.

As we saw in Section 3, the *because*-clause with a comma can be interpreted as meaning that both the main and subordinate clauses are asserted as information that can be challenged by the interlocutor. However, in this case even though there is a comma before *because*, the information that the speaker was a president is known to the interlocutor, because the speaker himself is the former president. Therefore, the information in the *because*-clause is not asserted even if there is a comma before the *because*-clause. In this sense, sentence (13) is deviant from the norm.

Note that some kind of interpersonal function can be found here. The speaker, as a former president, presents the information that he was a president known to the interlocutor, and by doing so, he tells the

interlocutor that it is no wonder that the merchants at the market overcharged him and that he accepted their high prices with the feeling, "It's not a problem. It can't be helped because I am president". By emphasizing the fact that he was a president in the *because*-clause, the speaker intends to present the information in the main clause with a special stylistic effect. The former president understands what the fish merchant did to him and solicits the interlocutor to share the same feeling as him. This stylistic effect is created by the deviation from the norm, in this case, the deviation in terms of the informational structure of the clauses.

5. Deviation from the norm on the judgment level

As we saw in the previous sections, the fundamental structure on the judgment level is that the speaker makes a judgment based on the facts he or she has gathered. The communicative function of a judgment sentence resides in the transmission of the speaker's judgment in the main clause. Therefore, from the informational point of view, the speaker's judgment is placed in the foreground and the basis of the judgment in the background. The sentence discussed in the previous section is reproduced here.

(14) Dawson must be at home, because the light is on.

The speaker wants to convey his judgment that Dawson is at home. The most likely context in which this sentence is uttered is that the speaker and interlocutor are discussing whether or not Dawson is at home. And the speaker of the sentence presents his opinion based on the fact that the light is on. We should note two characteristics of a judgment sentence. One is that the judgment part in the main clause is

the main part of the utterance. What the speaker wants to convey is his or her judgment. The other is that the basis of the judgment is an objective fact that can be verified. In this connection, two types of deviation are conceivable. One is the case in which the information in the subordinate clause is the foreground and can be pushed forward in the discourse, and the other is that the basis of the judgment is not a fact, but rather information which cannot be verified in an objective manner.

5.1. Deviation of the *because*-clause on the judgment level

The following discourse is a typical example illustrating the normal use of the *because*-clause on the judgment level we examined in Section 3.

- (15) "I didn't actually see the gun, but I heard this 'bang, bang, bang.'" Christine Burgess, a 56-year-old accountant, told PA she had seen police carry a black zip-up bag to an ambulance outside the station as she tried to get home on a bus. "I was looking out of the window and saw them bring out the black zip-up bag and that must have been the person involved because nobody else was hurt. I saw it taken into the ambulance."

(<http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/europe/07/22/london.eyewitness/index.html>)

In normal usage, the judgment based on the facts presented in the main clause is pushed forward in the subsequent discourse. In the above excerpt, the speaker's judgment ("that must have been the person involved") is developed in the following discourse, i. e. "I saw it taken into the ambulance". The information in the main clause is the judgment of the speaker, which is made on the basis of the facts presented in the

subordinate clause.

However, in the following excerpt, the situation is in a sense reversed. Note the information in the main clause is pushed into the background and the information presented in the subordinate clause is put forward in the subsequent discourse.

(16) I must have been tired, because I didn't wake up until after half-nine today. Apart from making a few phone calls, and watching "Click", I don't really know what I did during the day. During the evening, I spent a bit of time updating my blog. At about quarter-to-ten, Cherryboy called me to tell me that "Now That's What I Call Music" had just been released. I told him that a few weeks ago, my site had been second for searches for "Now That's What I Call Music" on Google. He checked again, and found out that I'm still on the second page.

(<http://www.robdictson.co.uk/blog/2008/03/16/diary>)

The above excerpt illustrates the situation in which the speaker wants to place more informational weight onto the subordinate sentence. The *because*-clause in the above excerpt demonstrates a somewhat deviant form from the norm in that the judgment presented in the main clause ("I must have been tired") is not pushed forward in the subsequent discourse, but the information presented in the subordinate clause will be propelled in the discourse following the underlined part.

Now, what kind of information is conveyed by the conversion of the informational structure of the main and subordinate clauses? As we saw in Section 3, as the basis of the judgment is getting evident, the judgment comes close to a fact, rather than the speaker's judgment. This process of making the judgment into the fact-like information happens in the above excerpt. The writer does not intend to present the

message (“I must have been tired”) as his judgment, but as an objective description of his own condition. By deviating the basis of his judgment from the norm, the writer wants to tell the interlocutor that he does not convey his judgment but the description of his own condition. In other words, what the speaker intends to do in the conversion of the foreground and background is to show the interlocutor the special way of presenting the information. If a series of facts is presented sufficiently, the judgment comes to turn into the fact-like information. What should be noticed here is that the deviation from the norm serves as the way the speaker conveys the message in a specific manner.

5.2. Deviation of the *if*-clause on the judgment level

Another type of deviation can be found in the case in which facts for a judgment presented in the subordinate clause cannot be verified in an appropriate way. It is natural that a judgment is made on the basis of the facts. In the following example we discussed in Section 3, the speaker assumes that the condition will be fulfilled. In other words, the *if*-clause does not express real condition, but rather the reason why the speaker has reached a certain conclusion, i. e. “you should study all night”.

(17) You should study all night, if you have exams tomorrow.

The speaker reaches the conclusion that the interlocutor should study all night on the basis of the fact that the interlocutor has exams the next day.

Now, deviation can occur when the basis of the judgment is not factual information, but rather information which cannot be verified. Consider the following sentence.

- (18) If I remember correctly, there is a whiskey bottle behind the books.

In an ordinary judgment sentence, the subordinate clause serves as the basis of the speaker's judgment, which is a fact that can be verified. However, in sentence (18), the basis of the speaker's judgment is not a fact; it is the speaker's proclamation about his or her own memory. The only way to prove that the speaker remembers it correctly is to check if there is a whiskey bottle behind the books. Therefore, as Pelyvás (1996: 76) states, the following sentence is logically possible.

- (19) If there is a whiskey bottle behind the books, I remember it correctly.

In this sense, sentence (18) is deviant in that the judgment is not based on facts, but on a statement that cannot be verified. It is impossible to verify the inner mental state of the speaker. By positing the *if*-clause in the statement which cannot be verified, the speaker wants to tell the interlocutor that the statement in the main clause, the speaker's judgment, is open to doubt. Thus, sentence (18) is equivalent in meaning to the following sentence (Pelyvás 1996: 69):

- (20) There may be a whiskey bottle behind the books.

The speaker of sentence (18) modifies his or her own statement in a certain manner. In this case, the speaker is not sure about the existence of a whiskey bottle behind the books. By presenting the basis of his or her judgment in a way that cannot be verified, the speaker can suspend his or her definite judgment about the existence of the bottle. The speaker leaves his or her judgment open to doubt, and this is what the

speaker wants to convey to the interlocutor.

6. Deviation from the norm and the levels of grammar

We have analyzed examples on the content and judgment levels, and deviations from normal types of utterance. Now let us speculate how we should deal with this kind of phenomenon in grammar. The first thing which should be taken into consideration is that these deviant forms are used in a context in which both the speaker and interlocutor are involved, and the speaker wants to convey a message with some special stylistic effect to the interlocutor. One clue to this problem is to focus on the similarity between this phenomenon and "style disjuncts" (Quirk et al. 1985). Semantically, style disjuncts express an evaluation of what is being said either with respect to the form of the communication or to its meaning.

In ordinary communication, it is common to find some overt indication of authority accompanying the statement such as *frankly* and *technically*. These style disjuncts can be paraphrased into the "I tell you" construction (cf. Quirk et al. 1985: 614).

(21) a. Frankly, Mr. Forster neglects his children.

b. I tell you frankly that Mr. Forster neglects his children.

(22) a. Technically, we're all travelling in time just by existing.

b. I tell you technically that we're all travelling in time just by existing.

For instance, if you are going to say something that the interlocutor might not like, you use the style disjunct *frankly* to show that you are being honest about saying something. By using the style disjunct *frankly* to let the interlocutor know in advance that what you are going to say

is not pleasant, you can reduce the amount of conflict that might occur between the speaker and the interlocutor. In this sense, style disjuncts should be dealt with on the level of real communication where both the speaker and interlocutor are involved. They usually accompany a change in attitude to the interlocutor. Style disjuncts make this change by having the speaker comment on the act of speaking: "I am speaking frankly, so please don't take it wrong." Style disjuncts modify the verb of communication which does not appear in the sentence because the communication verb is abbreviated in the surface as in (21a) and (22a). They convey a comment by the speaker on the style and form of what he or she is saying, defining in some way under what conditions he or she is speaking as the authority for the utterance. In this sense, style disjuncts serve to facilitate the communication between the speaker and interlocutor.

Let us re-examine the deviation from the norm we discussed in the previous sections in relation to style disjuncts.

(23) If I remember correctly, there is a whiskey bottle behind the books.

As we discussed, on the judgment level the *if*-clause can be used as evidence of why the speaker reaches the conclusion. The *if*-clause in a normal judgment sentence describes information which can be verified objectively. This is because the speaker makes a judgment on the basis of some specific facts. However, in (23), the basis of the judgment is the speaker's memory which cannot be verified in an objective way; the only way to verify the correctness of the speaker's memory is to check if the content of the main clause is correct. However, of course, it is a circulation of verification. In this sense, sentence (23) is deviant from

the norm as a judgment sentence. By placing a proposition which cannot be verified in the *if*-clause, the speaker wishes to tell the interlocutor that the content of the main clause may be true but cannot be affirmed. The deviation from the norm serves as a style disjunct. What the speaker intends to say is something like:

(24) I convey this message to you, but I am not sure about it. I use "If I remember correctly" as the basis of my judgment that there is a whiskey bottle behind the books. However, it is impossible to verify my memory without proving the fact given in the main clause. Therefore, I will present you the information of the main clause in a way open to doubt.

The similarity between "if I remember correctly" and style disjuncts is clear. The speaker says to the interlocutor that the existence of a whiskey bottle behind the books is not definite information that he or she is sure about. This comes from the fact that the only way to verify the memory of the speaker is to check the content of the main clause. Therefore, the overall meaning of sentence (23) is that the speaker is not sure about the existence of the whiskey bottle. What is at issue is that the speaker utters this message with relation to the interlocutor. By making the *if*-clause open to doubt, the deviant utterance from the norm represents the speaker's attitude towards the message presented toward the interlocutor: in this case, the speaker's attitude to leave the message open to doubt.

I have examined two types of utterance: utterance on the content and judgment levels. As far as the sentences on the content level are concerned, the role of the speaker is simply to utter a sentence. In this sense, the utterance is considered objective and the role of the speaker is not so crucial because the speaker is not involved in the interpreta-

tion of the utterance. A judgment sentence involves the speaker as we discussed in the previous sections. It is the speaker who makes a judgment that is presented in the utterance. As we saw, the judgment sentence *Mr. Forster neglects his children* should be read as meaning "From things I have heard and seen, I claim it to be a fair and true assessment that Mr. Forster neglects his children." It is the speaker ("I") who claims it to be a fair and true assessment that Mr. Forster neglects his children. The third level is where both the speaker and interlocutor are involved, in which style disjuncts and deviation from the norm are dealt with. As we saw in the previous sections, by describing a situation with deviation from the norm, the speaker conveys the message to the interlocutor with a special stylistic effect. For example, the speaker employs the narrative-*when*-clause because the speaker is willing to share the feeling of unexpectedness with the interlocutor and draw the interlocutor's attention to what is said in the *when*-clause. And the surprise and unexpectedness of the speaker associated with this construction is what the speaker wants to convey to the interlocutor.

7. Conclusion

In this essay, I have examined two types of utterance and deviations from normal types of utterance. We have pointed out that the deviant forms of utterance should be dealt with on the level where both the speaker and interlocutor are involved, because the speaker intends to convey a special stylistic and communicative effect. We have also suggested that the phenomena of deviation should be dealt with in relation to "style disjuncts" as in Quirk et al. (1985). This implies that the level of utterance we have considered is related to a style of language. What we have seen is that deviation from the norm creates a certain stylistic

change in the discourse. Leech (1966: 30) suggests the adjective “deviant” to characterize “an essential (perhaps the essential) feature of literary language.” He considers that the style is created by deviation from the norm. What we have discussed so far is not literary expression, but it has been suggested that both literary style and utterance with a special style are created by deviation from the norm.

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